This piece from Monday's Fayetteville (NC) Observer illustrates what it means when analysts say that the U.S. military is stretched too thin: it no longer has ability to match units to the task at hand. -- In particular, there is a shortage of light infantry and an inability of mechanized units to accomplish needed missions. -- "The active-duty Army has only four nonmechanized infantry divisions -- the 82nd, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), the 10th Mountain Division and the 25th Infantry Division," writes reporter Kevin Maurer. "There are also two airborne brigades -- one in Italy and the other in Alaska. Some light units are tied up in Afghanistan. The mountainous terrain there makes it hard to operate armored vehicles. 'There really is a shortage of troops. They don't have the choice to just send the light,' said Marcus Corbin, a military analyst for the Center for the Defense Information." -- But one of the reasons that the military has over-invested in mechanized units is that their use keeps casualty rates of U.S. forces down: "The Bradley Fighting Vehicle offers more firepower and better protection than the equipment in a light infantry unit's arsenal. The Pentagon planners have to weigh effectiveness and force protection in deciding which troops to send to various sectors in Iraq, where more than 1,400 American soldiers have been killed since March 2003. 'The Pentagon does understand they are walking a fine line between American casualty rates that are tolerable and casualty rates that are a problem,' [John] Pike [of GlobalSecurity.org] said. 'They need to keep the monthly American numbers in the double digits.'" ...
Infantry vs. Armor
DEBATE CONTINUES OVER TACTICS IN IRAQ
By Kevin Maurer
Fayetteville (NC) Observer
February 21, 2005
http://www.fayettevillenc.com/story.php?Template=local&Story=6862612
[PHOTO CAPTION: 82nd Airborne Division soldiers on a foot patrol provide security in a Baghdad neighborhood. The troops are from Company C, 3rd Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment.]
[PHOTO CAPTION: A Bradley fighting vehicle returns to Predator Palace from a mission. The Bradley is manned by soldiers of the 1st Cavalry Division.]
[PHOTO CAPTION: A Bradley fighting vehicle returns from a mission and enters through the west gate at Predator Palace in Iraq. The Bradley is manned by soldiers of the 1st Cavalry Division.]
[PHOTO CAPTION: Spec. Jamie Briggs carries an M-240 machine gun, a large rucksack and ammunition that together weigh more than 75 pounds. The soldiers are taking their full gear to a new location. Briggs is in Company C, 3rd Battalion, 325th Infantry Regiment.]
The battle over tactics in Iraq is being waged on bathroom walls.
In a latrine at a forward operating base, soldiers from the 82nd Airborne Division and the 1st Cavalry Division are scrawling insults at one another over which type of force -- mechanized or light infantry -- is better suited to fight the insurgency in Baghdad.
On one stall wall, an 82nd paratrooper drew a 1st Cavalry patch -- a yellow shield with a black diagonal stripe -- only the horse head that is one of the patch's distinctive features had been replaced by a horse's rear end. The artist had written "Haifa Street" along the black stripe.
There are few places in Baghdad where the difference in tactics between the "light" forces represented by the 82nd and the "heavy" forces such as the 1st Cavalry have been more obvious.
Haifa Street was known to the 1st Cavalry soldiers who patrolled it as "Grenade Alley" and "Purple Heart Lane." Insurgents operated freely, attacking patrols and keeping businesses shuttered and people trapped in their homes, 82nd soldiers said.
But after a month of patrols and raids by the 82nd, the number of attacks on Haifa Street dropped. Stores opened.
Children mobbed patrols and locals tipped off the paratroopers to insurgent plans. This month, the paratroopers turned over their base to Iraqi security forces.
TACTICAL RESULTS
To the 82nd soldiers, the results are vindication. They say they suppressed the insurgents where the 1st Cavalry failed. And, they say, their tactics -- patrolling on foot, talking to people, building sources, setting ambushes, kicking in doors -- are the reason for their success. The 1st Cavalry, they said, was handicapped by inflexibility: Soldiers stayed buttoned up in their armored vehicles and didn't build up intelligence by talking to people on Haifa Street. The vehicles, meanwhile, noisily gave the insurgents warning whenever a patrol was on the move.
As American forces attempt to stop the insurgency, the latrine-wall debate between the 82nd and the 1st Cavalry takes on more significance. It raises questions about just what forces -- light or armored -- are best suited to ferreting out the enemy in Baghdad and other cities so security duties can be turned over to Iraqis and U.S. soldiers can start coming home.
Pentagon officials and military analysts say there are no easy answers to the question -- and that there are not enough light forces to put out on the streets, anyway.
ROTATION QUESTIONS
The paratroopers' success on Haifa Street, meanwhile, led some soldiers to wonder why mechanized units continue to rotate into Baghdad. The Defense Department has been using mechanized units, who use armored fighting vehicles for transport and heavy weapons support, in Baghdad since the end of the invasion.
The 3rd Infantry Division was replaced by the Germany-based 1st Armored Division after Baghdad fell. The 1st Cavalry Division from Fort Hood arrived in Baghdad 10 months ago and will be replaced by the 3rd Infantry at the end of the month.
Military analysts say Pentagon planners send the heavy units for two reasons -- a lack of light infantry units and better protection against small arms fire and roadside bombs.
Lt. Col. Chris Rodney, an Army spokesman, said mechanized units make up the majority of the available units. "We have a certain force pool. We share the load as best we can," Rodney said.
The active-duty Army has only four nonmechanized infantry divisions -- the 82nd, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), the 10th Mountain Division and the 25th Infantry Division. There are also two airborne brigades -- one in Italy and the other in Alaska.
Some light units are tied up in Afghanistan. The mountainous terrain there makes it hard to operate armored vehicles.
"There really is a shortage of troops. They don't have the choice to just send the light," said Marcus Corbin, a military analyst for the Center for the Defense Information.
Some heavy units, such as North Carolina's 30th Heavy Separate Brigade, took a "light infantry" approach when they deployed to Iraq. The tankers left most of their normal equipment at home and did their patrolling on foot or in armored Humvees.
TOUGH TO CHANGE
Military experts said that may be an option, but it is difficult to change how the larger divisions are equipped in the middle of a war. "I don't think we are in any position to regroup the force on the fly," said John Pike, the head of GlobalSecurity.org, an independent military research group.
Such a change could also hurt the Army. Pike said Army Chief of Staff Gen. Peter Schoomaker has to focus on future wars, not just Iraq and Afghanistan.
"You are not going to take on the People's Army of Korea with a Humvee. You have to fight them with tanks and Bradleys," Pike said. "The Bradley is a battlefield vehicle. Humvees were not designed to survive on a battlefield."
The Bradley Fighting Vehicle offers more firepower and better protection than the equipment in a light infantry unit's arsenal. The Pentagon planners have to weigh effectiveness and force protection in deciding which troops to send to various sectors in Iraq, where more than 1,400 American soldiers have been killed since March 2003.
"The Pentagon does understand they are walking a fine line between American casualty rates that are tolerable and casualty rates that are a problem," Pike said. "They need to keep the monthly American numbers in the double digits."
But Bradleys are not the best way to fight an insurgency, 82nd commanders on the ground in Baghdad said. Several e-mail requests for an interview with soldiers from the 1st Cavalry Division about their tactics were unanswered.
"You have to put boots on the ground. You have to get out of your tracks and walk the streets," said one officer in the 82nd's 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment. The paratroopers say their tactics are not complicated. Constant foot patrols and ambushes are the keys to success.
They point out an example: One of the paratroopers' first missions was to clear roadside bombs from the main supply route from downtown Baghdad to the airport. 1st Cavalry soldiers, patrolling in Bradleys, had trouble keeping insurgents from planting bombs. Paratroopers used foot patrols and built up a relationship with locals who let the troops set up ambushes in their houses along the road. In less than a month, the route was clear. But the 82nd battalion was moved to Mosul, and paratroopers said the route has again become dangerous.
--Staff writer Kevin Maurer can be reached at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. or 486-3587.