United for Peace of Pierce County, WA - We nonviolently oppose the reliance on unilateral military actions rather than cooperative diplomacy.

Two days after he was understood to have said a P5+1 negotiating offer was acceptable "in principle," a key Iranian adviser appeared on Iranian television to contradict that impression, the Financial Times reported Friday.[1] -- "Analysts said the backtracking reflected the debate inside the regime at a time of rising tensions, provoked by speculation of a possible Israeli airstrike on Iran's nuclear facilities," according to Najmeh Bozorgmehr. -- "It is not unusual for politicians in Iran to appear on television to 'correct' earlier interviews and this tends to happen on two particularly sensitive issues — the nuclear program and rapprochement with the U.S." -- The only thing clear about the diplomatic situation is that it is confusing reporters. -- On the same day that the Daily Telegraph (London) said that "America and its allies have quietly watered down their stance on Iran's nuclear program,"[2] AFP said that the U.S. "maintained its demand that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment."[3] -- Michael Hirsh of Newsweek, for one, is growing impatient: on Wednesday he wonder whether Tehran was engaging in deliberate delaying tactics worthy of Scheherezade.[4] -- "Still, there is good news to be found in all this Machiavellian maneuvering. Too often Iran is depicted as a monolithic terror state hell bent on a bomb when in fact it has a history of mostly careful, reasonable behavior. . . . During my trip to Iran, my conversations with hard-liners and reformers suggested that under the right circumstances, Tehran may still be willing to stop short of building and testing a bomb." -- BACKGROUND: You'd never guess from Hirsh's accounts that it is the U.S., not Iran, that has a history of being unwilling to negotiate in good faith. -- Trita Parsi, in Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S. (Yale UP, 2007), has described how in spring 2002 Israel began arguing that "Iran should be the real target" for the U.S. in the Middle East, even as the U.S. was reopening the Geneva Channel for discussions with Iran. -- In May 2003, after Baghdad fell, Iran, feeling encircled, offered a comprehensive proposal for discussions that was stunning in its comprehensiveness, using Robert Ney (R-OH 18th, the only Persian-speaking member of Con-gress) to ensure it reached the White House. -- In vain. -- The U.S. ignored the proposal and responded by rebuking the Swiss who delivered it. -- Iran made a similar offer to Israel. -- But neoconservatives on both sides of the Atlantic wanted confrontation with Iran and for regime change. -- When the insurgency in Iraq made Iran the winner of the Iraq war, the U.S. had only itself to blame for "snatching defeat from the jaws of victory," to use a phrase chosen by Parsi to name the chapter in which these lost opportunities are described in detail (Treacherous Alliance, pp. 238-57). -- The missed 2003 opportunity followed others in 1991 and 1997....

TEHRAN -- Iran yesterday sought to quell speculation that it was about to bow to international demands for a suspension of its nuclear program, insisting that the more conciliatory tone adopted in remarks in recent weeks did not amount to a surrender.

Two days after Ali-Akbar Velayati, a senior adviser to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader, said Tehran should consider taking up aspects of an offer made by world powers last month, he appeared on television to clarify the interview he had given to a local newspaper.

In the statements made this week, Mr. Velayati said the package of incentives by five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany -- the so-called P5+1 -- could be acceptable "in principle" and that it was "expedient" for Iran to resume negotiations so as not to appear -- "isolated."

Specifically Mr. Velayati said talks could start with a pre-negotiation phase or the so-called "freeze-for-freeze" which was offered by the Western powers as a sweetener. Under this phase, Iran would not expand nuclear enrichment while the U.N. Security Council would halt further sanctions for six weeks.

Mr. Velayati did not address the more sensitive issue of enrichment suspension stipulated by U.N. resolutions. Iran would have to suspend its uranium enrichment program in a second phase, when talks with world powers would begin on the wider fate of its nuclear program.

However, Mr. Velayati, who advises Ayatollah Khamenei on international issues, yesterday said he had not commented on the international proposal, which was delivered to Tehran by Javier Solana, European Union foreign policy chief.

He said that his intention in the newspaper interview was simply to say that negotiating with world powers was acceptable. This time, he clearly stated that suspension of uranium enrichment was not an acceptable condition ahead of full negotiations.

Analysts said the backtracking reflected the debate inside the regime at a time of rising tensions, provoked by speculation of a possible Israeli airstrike on Iran's nuclear facilities.

Mr. Veyalati's statements this week were followed by more conciliatory remarks from Manouchehr Mottaki, the foreign minister, and suggested some flexibility on the Iranian side.

The comments led to speculation that Iran might agree to freeze the expansion of its program for a set time -- perhaps until a new U.S. administration comes into office -- thereby delaying economic sanctions and military action.

It is not unusual for politicians in Iran to appear on television to "correct" earlier interviews and this tends to happen on two particularly sensitive issues -- the nuclear program and rapprochement with the U.S.

"Mr. Velayati's interview sounded like what he believes in," said one former senior official. "Since Velayati is adviser to the supreme leader, it must have been Ayatollah Khamenei urging him to correct his remarks on concerns that it gave the impression that that was his view, too."

A security official said Iran was not close to any decision on the freeze phase yet, but he said "a solution out of this impasse definitely needs to be found."

America and its allies have quietly watered down their stance on Iran's nuclear program, pledging no more economic sanctions if Tehran keeps its enrichment of uranium at present levels.

This vital process, taking place inside Iran's underground plant in Natanz, could be used to produce weapons-grade uranium -- the essential material for a nuclear bomb.

America's position had been that Iran must completely stop enriching uranium or face steadily increasing pressure. Four United Nations Resolutions, three of which impose economic sanctions on Tehran, make this demand.

Yet the latest offer to Iran softens this stance. When a delegation of diplomats from Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China travelled to Tehran last month, they offered economic and technical help if Iran completely stopped enriching uranium.

Crucially, they also said that if Iran merely froze enrichment at present levels, no new sanctions would be imposed.

This "freeze for freeze" idea was first mooted in 2006 when Iran began enriching uranium. The vital difference is that two years ago, Iran was only operating 300 centrifuges. Today, it has ten times as many.

In its latest report, the International Atomic Energy Agency says that Iran is operating 3,000 centrifuges inside the Natanz plant.

These machines could be used to produce the fuel for nuclear power stations -- which Iran says is the only intention -- or enough material for a nuclear bomb in about a year.

While America did not send a representative to the meetings in Tehran, Condoleezza Rice, the U.S. secretary of state, formally endorsed the offer and the negotiating position.

Javier Solana, the European Union's foreign policy chief, led the delegation to Tehran and proposed the "freeze for freeze" idea. He added that if Iran stopped expanding its enrichment plant for six weeks, no further penalties would be imposed and preliminary negotiations could start.

"This would be a negotiating tool to open up a bit of common ground," said James Howarth, deputy head of the Middle East division at Exclusive Analysis, a political risk agency.

"But if the Iranians did agree to that, there's still a big step between that and suspending enrichment altogether."

He added: "A lot of the Iranian government feels Iran is in such a strong position, with oil prices at 140 or 145 dollars per barrel. They feel that eventually the world will have to accept that Iran will have its nuclear capability."

The "freeze for freeze" offer -- with its acceptance that Iran can operate 3,000 centrifuges without incurring more sanctions -- may be interpreted as the first sign that America is becoming reconciled to Iran's nuclear ambitions.

This might explain recent conciliatory signals from Iran about last month's offer. Saeed Jalili, the chief negotiator on nuclear issues and a noted hardliner, said it might be possible to "create a suitable political atmosphere for a new round of constructive cooperation."

But the full package of economic and technical benefits, together with the lifting of existing sanctions, would only happen if Iran completely stops enriching uranium. At present, Iran's plans provide for the installation of as many as 48,000 centrifuges.

WASHINGTON -- The United States on Thursday maintained its demand that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment as a condition for Washington participating in formal nuclear talks with Tehran, although it did not rule out less strict pre-negotiations.

"We have talked to the Iranians previously via the P5-plus-1 and Mr. Solana about various ways to get to full-blown negotiations," State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said, referring to grouping of Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia and the United States, as well as E.U. foreign policy chief Javier Solana who has engaged Tehran on nuclear issues.

"In order to get to those full-blown negotiations where you have the U.S. and the other five members of the P5-plus-1 present at the table with the Iranians, they are going to have to suspend their enrichment-related activity.

"And of course there would be a suspension of activities in the (U.N.) Security Council during that," McCormack added.

Asked about a formula known as "freeze for freeze" -- under which Tehran would freeze its nuclear enrichment program at current levels in exchange for no new U.N. Security Council sanctions -- the spokesman did not deny the possibility of implementing such a proposal ahead of further talks.

But he stressed that the six powers were still awaiting a formal response from Tehran to their fresh cooperation offer that Solana presented to Iran in mid-June.

The proposal, aiming at ending the five-year crisis over Tehran's nuclear program, offers technological incentives in exchange for Tehran suspending uranium enrichment.

Tehran denies that its program hides a nuclear weapons quest. U.S. President George W. Bush has said that he has not ruled out using force against Iran to prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons.

The Islamic republic has put forward its own package, a more all-embracing effort to solve global problems, and notably suggests the setting up of a consortium in Iran for enriching uranium.

A senior State Department official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that "there have been various discussions about quote-unquote 'pre-negotiations' or how to do a period leading up to full-blown negotiations."

But he stressed that "the conditions for us getting to the table and realizing full-blown negotiations are suspension (of enrichment).

In the famous fairy tale, the Persian Queen Scheherazade strings out stories for a thousand and one nights until her matricidal husband, the king, finally accepts her in his household. On Tuesday, as I sat listening to Manouchehr Mottaki, Iran's genial foreign minister, come up with yet another enticing response to the latest Western proposal for halting the country's alleged nuclear weapons program, I wondered again whether Tehran was taking a tactical cue from its ancient forebear. Is Iran playing the West the way Scheherazade played the king, by making occasional agreeable noises -- thereby sowing self-doubt among its adversaries -- and avoiding conclusive ultimatums? Is Tehran endlessly prolonging the talks until an exhausted United States and Europe are forced to accept its uranium enrichment program?

It's a serious question, one that could mean the difference between war and peace in the Middle East. On one hand, Mottaki's positive comments to American reporters at a lunch at Iran's mission to the United Nations in New York suggested that his country is suddenly willing to negotiate a halt to enrichment -- at least temporarily -- on the basis of the latest package of incentives offered by the West on June 14. His comments came the same day as similar remarks made by Mottaki's more powerful patron, Ali Akbar Velayati, foreign policy advisor to supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Mottaki referred to a "new process" and a more "constructive" mood. Velayati, in widely noted comments to a hard-line Iranian newspaper, seemed to criticize President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and other right-wingers. "Those who are agitating against our interests want that we reject the offer. As a consequence, it is in our interests to accept it," he said.

Most notable of all, Mottaki passed up several chances during the interview to reiterate Tehran's long-stated view that it has an "inalienable right" to enrichment. And he became the latest Iranian official to hint that a "freeze for freeze" proposal by Javier Solana, the chief European negotiator, might be acceptable. The idea, according to an official close to Solana, is to come up with a "mechanism" for allowing the two sides to retreat from the corners they have painted themselves into -- with the West insisting on suspension of enrichment before it will talk, and Iran refusing to stop before it negotiates -- by simply halting everything where it currently stands. Western sanctions would continue, but with no new U.N. Security Council resolutions, while Iran would keep its current enrichment capacity without adding any.

This marks a reversal from weeks of determined non-negotiation by Tehran, suggesting several possibilities. One is that Western sanctions have had some bite. The second: That martial noises emanating from Washington and Jerusalem have scared the Iranians, encouraging dissenters in Tehran to speak out (with quiet approval from the all-powerful Khamenei) against Ahmadinejad's blustery refusals to talk. Frankly, I don't buy either of these explanations. While it's clear that the sanctions approved by the U.N. Security Council, and in particular a U.S.-orchestrated effort to choke off Iran's finances, have created anxiety in Tehran, there is hardly panic. Why should there be? With oil at $144 a barrel, Iran, the world's fourth largest producer of crude, is not about to be reduced to penury. Tehran also knows that with oil soaring, it possesses the power to drive those prices much higher, possibly tipping the global economy into recession. It's also unlike the proud Iranian regime to appear to blanch in the face of threats of an Israeli or U.S. military strike. "It would be very strange for them to project a conciliatory stance now," says Karim Sadjadpour of the Carnegie Endowment. "My interpretation is more that they are throwing a few bones our way."

Indeed, there is ample evidence that Iran has long pursued a divide-and-conquer-the-West approach to securing a nuclear capability. The European-led negotiations with Tehran, which have continued for six years, have consisted of numerous false hopes and carefully adumbrated, then aborted, Iranian initiatives. Tehran has also continually sought to sow discord among the board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and to string along its director general, Mohamed ElBaradei. In an interview during a trip I made to Tehran a year ago, I asked Iran's then-chief negotiator, Ali Larijani, whether it was in fact his strategy "to win over ElBaradei and the IAEA by satisfying [ElBaradei's] concerns" about the intent of Iran's nuclear program. Larijani smiled faintly and answered, "We have no problem with the agency. We welcome agency surveillance, and inspections, and their cameras are in place." Not suprisingly, in subsequent months Tehran opened its arms to the IAEA and agreed to a "work plan" to address ElBaradei's questions about Iran's past nuclear practices. The hope was to delay a third U.N. Security Council resolution condemning Iran's program. The tactic succeeded for almost a year, as Russia and China put off the discussions of a resolution while the IAEA and Iran dickered over piecemeal disclosures from Tehran.

Still, there is good news to be found in all this Machiavellian maneuvering. Too often Iran is depicted as a monolithic terror state hell bent on a bomb when in fact it has a history of mostly careful, reasonable behavior. Iranian diplomats say it is still possible to find some middle ground that might allow all parties -- possibly even Israel -- to stand down. During my trip to Iran, my conversations with hard-liners and reformers suggested that under the right circumstances, Tehran may still be willing to stop short of building and testing a bomb. "Iran would like to have the technology, and that is enough for deterrence," S.M.H. Adeli, Iran's moderate, urbane former ambassador to London, told me at the time. This view was later echoed by the National Intelligence Report that was issued last fall. One proposal that keeps cropping up is the idea of an international consortium under IAEA supervision that would oversee Iranian enrichment. Governments such as Britain and Germany could be among the shareholders. This concept was first floated back in early 2006 by John Thomson, the former chairman of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Iranians keep bringing it up. Indeed, one reason for the latest positive sounds coming out of Tehran appears to be that Solana, the European negotiator, is edging closer to at least talking about this. And he is placating Iran's pride by referring to Tehran's "inalienable right" to civilian nuclear power.

Mottaki's smiling, soft-spoken manner in New York this week, as he treated his journalistic guests to a lunch of chicken, rice and kabob, suggested that the Iranian moderates are encouraged by the "different" tone of the latest Solana proposal. And Mottaki's close reading of the internal politics of both the U.S and Israel suggests that Iran is following every tick of opinion in the West. Mottaki, asked about a possible Israeli attack, commented on the weakness of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's government and referred to the Labor Party's threat to withdraw from it. And he was obviously aware that Barack Obama has said he would drop the precondition that Iran suspend enrichment before entering into talks with Tehran; when I challenged him to say whether that means Iran will simply wait for the U.S. election, he danced around it, indicating he knew that voicing support for the Democrat could upset Obama's chances. It is clear that Iran does not want to take its defiance too far. Tehran's central bankers, for example, are extremely worried about the cutoff of Euro trade, and its banks are already quietly moving their assets to Asian banks. So Scheherazade is still talking -- but she seems to be listening as well.