United for Peace of Pierce County, WA - We nonviolently oppose the reliance on unilateral military actions rather than cooperative diplomacy.

On Monday, the Pentagon announced the withdrawal of the final "surge" brigade in Iraq (from a location kept secret for security reasons) but also announced plans to send 33,000 more troops to Iraq, and there was talk of sending 7,000 more troops to Afghanistan. -- By the end of July the number of U.S. combat brigade teams in Iraq will return to fifteen, the level at the beginning of the so-called "surge," Reuters reported Tuesday.[1] -- "[A]bout 140,000" U.S. troops will then be in Iraq, down from "160,000-170,000" at the peak of the "surge," in 2007. -- The military spokesperson making the announcement "declined to identify the brigade or give its location for security reasons." -- The Pentagon also announced Monday that "The United States will send six additional combat units, totalling around 33,000 soldiers and marines, to Iraq in early 2009."[2] -- The Washington Post, meanwhile, reported that "June was the deadliest month for U.S. troops in Afghanistan since the war there began in late 2001."[3] -- "Taliban units and other insurgent fighters have reconstituted in the country's south and east," and "[v]iolence in rural areas controlled by the Taliban and in eastern provinces along the Pakistan border has surged in recent weeks as insurgents have begun using more improvised bombs . . . The 28 U.S. troops were killed by improvised roadside bombs, small arms fire, rocket attacks, and in unspecified 'combat operations.' The total nearly equaled the 29 announced troop deaths last month in Iraq . . . There have been 533 combat deaths to date in Afghanistan, where 32,000 U.S. troops are stationed along with about 30,000 from other countries." -- "Among the American-led forces in the two countries, 46 service members were killed in Afghanistan, compared with 31 in Iraq, the second straight month in which combat deaths in Afghanistan exceeded those in Iraq," the New York Times noted.[4] -- "The Pentagon is now considering sending an additional 7,000 troops to help tamp down the worsening violence," Mark Mazzetti said. -- A new Pentagon report speaks of "the potential for 'two distinct insurgencies in Afghanistan': a Taliban-led insurgency based in the southern city of Kandahar, and a confederation of militant groups in eastern Afghanistan that occasionally find refuge in Pakistan’s tribal areas." -- According to U.S. budgetary accounting methods, the cost of the war in Afghanistan from fiscal year 2001 to 2007 has been $126.8bn, and the cost of the Iraq war from fiscal year 2003 through 2007 has been $448.6bn.[5] -- In fact, these figures radically underestimate the cost of the conflicts, in particular because the Dept. of Defense uses faulty "cash" rather than "accrual" accounting methods in order to disguise the true costs of combat, as Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz and co-author and government finance and budgeting expert Linda J. Bilmes demonstrated in their March 2008 book, The Three Trillion Dollar War. -- A detailed synopsis of that volume appears below.[6] ...

BAGHDAD -- The U.S. military has begun withdrawing from Iraq the last of the five additional combat brigades that were deployed to the country in 2007, a U.S. military spokesman said on Tuesday.

The final "surge" brigade would leave Iraq by the end of July, the spokesman said. That was in line with plans by General David Petraeus, the commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, who has said lower levels of violence would allow the reductions.

The U.S. military had 20 combat brigades in Iraq at its peak in 2007, with troop levels around 160,000-170,000. Numbers will fall to about 140,000 once the final "surge" brigade departs.

"Elements of the fifth surge brigade have already begun redeploying, so, by the end of July, we will be at 15 combat brigade teams in Iraq," the military spokesman said.

U.S. President George W. Bush sent an extra 30,000 soldiers to Iraq last year to stop savage sectarian violence between majority Shi'ites and minority Sunni Arabs that threatened to tip the country into all-out civil war.

The troop buildup was credited with helping improve security. Other factors were a rebellion by Sunni Arab tribal leaders against al Qaeda and a ceasefire by anti-American Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.

In late May, Petraeus said he expected to recommend resuming withdrawals after a 45-day freeze to take stock of conditions.

Democratic presidential candidate Barack Obama has called for the removal of U.S. combat troops from Iraq within 16 months of taking office should he win the election.

Republican candidate Senator John McCain says the U.S. troop buildup has helped boost stability in Iraq. He has criticized Democrats' promises for a quick withdrawal as "reckless."

** Around 33,000 more troops to be sent by early 2009 -- Iraqi civilian deaths drop down to four-year-low in June **

WASHINGTON/BAGHDAD -- The United States will send six additional combat units, totalling around 33,000 soldiers and marines, to Iraq in early 2009, the Pentagon announced on Monday.

Officials said the units would replace troops currently serving in Iraq, and will allow the Pentagon to hold steady at 15 fighting brigades there. “This is a planning effort to sustain the current level of operations,” said spokesman Bryan Whitman, who added that U.S. military leaders “can always have units that re-deploy earlier and deploy later” as needed.

Whitman said the announcement had been made months in advance to give the U.S. armed forces members time to make the necessary preparations. “It’s proper, prudent planning to give units the time to train, and to ensure they are notified in a deliberate fashion, and well in advance of when they would have to deploy,” he said.

General David Petraeus, who received a Senate committee’s approval last week to become U.S. commander in the Middle East, is by September to make a recommendation on whether a drawdown of U.S. forces can continue after the last surge brigade leaves Iraq in July. Petraeus currently serves as commander of U.S. forces in Iraq.

Civilian deaths: Meanwhile, the number of civilians killed in Iraq fell in June despite a few large bombings, keeping violence levels at around four-year lows, Iraqi government figures showed on Tuesday.

The statistics come at a time when the U.S. military is close to completing a draw down of more than 20,000 combat troops that were sent to Iraq in early 2007 to pull the country back from the brink of an all-out sectarian civil war. Numbers from the Health Ministry showed 448 civilians were killed in June, from 505 in May. The May figure was down from 968 civilian deaths in April, a month when fighting spiralled between Shia militias and security forces. U.S. troop deaths in Iraq rose to 29 in June from 19 in May, according to the independent website icasualties.org, which tracks American casualty figures.

The May number was the lowest since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. In June last year, 101 U.S. troops were killed. The five-year-old war in Iraq has claimed the lives of more than 4,000 American soldiers and tens of thousands of Iraqis. Despite improved security, U.S. generals have stressed that gains are both fragile and reversible.

That was shown in March and April, when government offensives against Shia militias sparked a surge in violence in the capital Baghdad and other cities. In one of the deadliest attacks last month, a truck bomb killed 63 people in Baghdad on June 17. Those types of attacks, a regular occurrence in 2006 and in the first half of 2007, are now relatively rare.

U.S. officials credit the turnaround in security to President George W. Bush’s decision to send extra troops to Iraq, a rebellion by Sunni tribal leaders against Al Qaeda, and a ceasefire by anti-American Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.

WASHINGTON -- June was the deadliest month for U.S. troops in Afghanistan since the war there began in late 2001, as resilient and emboldened insurgents have stepped up attacks in an effort to wrest control of the embattled country.

Defense officials and Afghanistan specialists said the 28 U.S. combat deaths recorded in June demonstrate a new resurgence of the Taliban. Taliban units and other insurgent fighters have reconstituted in the country's south and east, aided by easy passage from mountain redoubts in neighboring Pakistan's lawless regions.

The officials and specialists said the spike in troop deaths should not be taken as the only measure of the growing conflict in Afghanistan, but they acknowledged that the Taliban's persistent attacks on military units and civilians have succeeded in frustrating U.S. and international efforts to help the Afghan government secure the country.

"What it points to is that the opposition is becoming more effective," said Barnett Rubin, an Afghanistan analyst at New York University. "It is having a presence in more areas, being better organized, better financed, and having a sustainable strategy."

Violence in rural areas controlled by the Taliban and in eastern provinces along the Pakistan border has surged in recent weeks as insurgents have begun using more improvised bombs, borrowing a tactic honed by insurgents in Iraq. According to top U.S. commanders, the number of violent incidents has increased nearly 40 percent during the first half of 2008, as compared to last year.

The grim total surpassed the 27 troop fatalities in Afghanistan in June 2005. But that total included the 16 troops killed on a single day in a helicopter crash.

The 28 U.S. troops were killed by improvised roadside bombs, small arms fire, rocket attacks, and in unspecified "combat operations." The total nearly equaled the 29 announced troop deaths last month in Iraq, where violence has abated in the wake of the U.S. troop buildup that began last year.

There have been 533 combat deaths to date in Afghanistan, where 32,000 U.S. troops are stationed along with about 30,000 from other countries.

WASHINGTON -- More American and coalition troops died in Afghanistan last month than during any other month since the American-led invasion began in 2001, the latest evidence of a strengthening Taliban insurgency that has menaced NATO forces and reclaimed control over some southern and eastern parts of the country.

The violence in Afghanistan has surged at the same time as the number of attacks and American deaths in Iraq have fallen. Among the American-led forces in the two countries, 46 service members were killed in Afghanistan, compared with 31 in Iraq, the second straight month in which combat deaths in Afghanistan exceeded those in Iraq.

A recent Pentagon report about Afghanistan painted a stark picture of security conditions inside the country, a militant force that had “coalesced into a resilient insurgency” and a central government in Kabul that still could not extend its reach into the hinterlands. An American commander, Maj. Gen. Jeffrey J. Schloesser, has said that militant attacks on coalition troops increased by 40 percent from January to May compared with the same period last year.

The violence has spiked even as the number of foreign troops in Afghanistan approaches its highest level since 2001. Roughly 32,000 American troops are deployed inside the country, up from 25,000 in 2005. The Pentagon is now considering sending an additional 7,000 troops to help tamp down the worsening violence.

The American-led coalition also includes about 38,000 troops from dozens of other countries who are operating under NATO leadership.

Still, American commanders in Kabul and military officials in Washington have said that coalition force levels remain too low. Before departing Afghanistan last month at the end of a tour as senior commander there, Gen. Dan K. McNeill called Afghanistan an “under-resourced war,” and he warned that Pakistan was not doing nearly enough to stem the flow of militant fighters across the mountain border it shares with Afghanistan.

General McNeill said the Afghanistan mission “needs more maneuver units, it needs more flying machines, it needs more intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance units.”

Even with thousands more American troops possibly heading to Afghanistan, military officials said that still might not be enough. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has repeatedly urged NATO member countries to commit more troops to the conflict, but those commitments have been few and far between.

The growing concern expressed by American commanders is fueled by intelligence reports about an increasingly complex enemy. The Pentagon report, released last week, describes the potential for “two distinct insurgencies in Afghanistan”: a Taliban-led insurgency based in the southern city of Kandahar, and a confederation of militant groups in eastern Afghanistan that occasionally find refuge in Pakistan’s tribal areas.

The “shared goals” of the two insurgencies, the report said, “include the expulsion of all foreign military forces from Afghanistan, the elimination of external government influence in their respective areas, and the imposition of a religiously conservative, Pashtun-led government.”

The increase in violence in Afghanistan in recent months is partly a function of the weather. The tradition in a country that has known war for centuries is for fighting to subside during the winter, when snow blankets much of the country. The melting of the snow brings with it a resurgence of guerrilla combat.

The data on combat deaths in Afghanistan and Iraq comes from Pentagon figures and an independent Web site, icasualties.org, that compiles official casualty reports. Lt. Col. Les’ A. Melnyk, a Pentagon spokesman, said the Defense Department’s final death tally for June could still rise after military officials notify family members of personnel killed in the two countries.

It is difficult to track figures for civilian deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan, because neither country’s government keeps reliable monthly casualty statistics.

With the violence in Afghanistan and Iraq appearing to be following opposite trajectories, Afghan militants are increasingly turning to tactics first employed by Iraqi insurgents. The Pentagon report notes an increase in attacks using roadside bombs. Attacks of this type already increased to 2,615 in 2007, from 1,931 in 2006.

American military and intelligence officials are almost unanimous about the most significant factor fueling the Afghan insurgency: the ability of militant groups to operate with relative impunity inside Pakistan’s tribal areas. The officials say the groups use the tribal areas as a haven and a base to stage cross-border attacks into Afghanistan.

American officials are openly critical of Pakistan’s efforts against militant groups and are skeptical of the Pakistani government’s attempts to negotiate with tribal leaders, who operate with a high degree of autonomy.

In both 2005 and 2006, after Pakistani leaders negotiated peace deals with militants, cross-border attacks on coalition troops in Afghanistan skyrocketed.

According to the Center for Defense Information, the estimated cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan varies dramatically depending on what federal agency is doing the reporting. The Congressional Research Service (see their table below) concludes that the total cost of the wars thus far (through FY 2007) has been $448.6 billion, while the Congressional Budget Office puts it at $463 billion, the Government Accountability Office estimates $447.8 billion, and the Department of Defense lowballs it at $426.5 billion -- a range of figures varying by more than $20 billion. One reason for such discrepancies is that most war-related costs are not included in the actual U.S. Defense Budget but are submitted over the course of the fiscal year in the form of “supplemental appropriations” and “bridge funds,” which, according to the Congressional Budget Office “do not provide enough detail to determine how . . . funds for operations in Iraq and the war on terrorism have been obligated.”

IRAQ: 2001+2002: $0 -- 2003: $53.0bn -- 2004: $75.9bn -- 2005: $84.6bn -- 2006: $101.9bn -- 2007: $133.2bn -- TOTAL 2001-2007: $448.6bn

AFGHANISTAN: 2001-2002: $20.8bn -- 2003: $14.7bn -- 2004: $14.5bn -- 2005: $20.9bn -- 2006: $19.1bn -- 2007: $36.8bn -- TOTAL 2001-2007: $126.8bn

ENHANCED SECURITY: 2001-2002: $13.0bn -- 2003: $8.0bn -- 2004: $3.7bn -- 2005: $2.1bn -- 2006: $0.8bn -- 2007: $0.4bn -- TOTAL 2001-2007: $28.0bn

TOTALS: 2001-2002: $33.8bn -- 2003: $81.1bn -- 2004: $94.1bn -- 2005: $107.6bn -- 2006: $121.6bn -- $170.4bn -- TOTAL 2001-2007: $608.8bn

[2003:] Includes $5.5 billion of $7.1 billion appropriated in DOD's FY2003 Appropriations Act (P.L. 107-48) for the global war on terror that CRS cannot allocate and DOD cannot track.

[2004:] Of the $25 billion provided in Title IX of the FY2005 DOD appropriation bill, CRS includes $2 billion in FY2004 when it was obligated and the remaining $23 billion in FY2005. Because Congress made the funds available in FY2004, CBO and OMB score all $25 billion in FY2004.

[2005:] Includes funds in the FY2007 Supplemental (H.R. 2206/P.L. 110-28), Title IX, P.L. 109-289, FY2007 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 5631) designated for war and funds for other agencies in H.J. Res 20, P.L. 110-50, the year-long Continuing Resolution. VA Medical estimates reflect VA FY2008 budget materials and CRS estimates. Amounts for foreign and diplomatic operations reflects State Department figures.

Joseph E. Stiglitz and Linda J. Bilmes, The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict (New York & London: W.W. Norton, [March] 2008).

Preface. It is clear the U.S. invasion of Iraq was "a terrible mistake" (ix). Examining costs increases our understanding of war's implications (x). The Gulf War's costs go on (xi). U.S. accounting methods are bad (xii). Planning for veterans has been inadequate (xiii-xiv). For the U.S., the issue is not bankruptcy, but priorities (xv-xvii). This book is based on an earlier paper (xvii-xviii). As ardent opponents of the war since the start, the authors have been conservative in their estimates, excessively so (xviii-xix). Rejection of the argument that the war had "benefits" (xix-xxi).

Ch. 1: Is It Really Three Trillion? The Iraq war is a failure (3-5; "a humiliating failure" [169]). Costs have been chronically underestimated (5-7). A variety of factors has raised the cost of the war by 130% since 2003 (10-16). Many costs are hidden through undervaluation (17-18). The DoD's faulty "cash" rather than "accrual" accounting methods disguise the true costs (18-21). Budgetary oversight has been subverted (21-24). Explanation of steps in estimating costs (24-31). Even "a 'best-case' scenario in which the United States would withdraw all its combat troops by 2012" yields a cost of over $2 trillion (31). $3 trillion "represents the cost only to the United States" (31, emphasis in original).

Ch. 2: The Costs to the Nation's Budget. So far, $645 billion has been spent (34-35). Two scenarios: "best case," with decline to 55,000 non-combat by 2012 and a total of 18 million "unique troops" deployed to the conflict by 2017, and a "realistic-moderate" scenario, with a slower decline to 75,000 in 2012 and 2.1 million troops by 2017 (35-37). The claims rates used take 1991 Gulf War as a benchmark, which is "extremely conservative" (37-40). Disability claims estimate 850,000 will file (40-41). Equipment (41-43). Restoring the military "to its full strength" (43-44). Demobilization (44-45). Defense spending was 4.2% of GDP in 2008 (3% in 2001) and 51% of government discretionary spending (48% in 2000) (45). The military hides war spending in its "normal" defense budget (45-46). Recruitment (47-48). Other difficulties in calculations (48-50). Privatizing war means costs appear as workman's comp (50-52). Oil and macroeconomic costs (52-53). Interest costs (53-55). No free lunch -- we'll pay one way or another (55-56). Tables of costs (57-59).

Ch. 3: The True Cost of Caring for Our Veterans. Historically high 7 to 1 ratio of wounded to dead in Iraq and Afghanistan (15 to 1 if non-combat injuries are included) (61). Disease (62). Government obfuscation of statistics (62-65). Injuries, focusing on traumatic brain injury (TBI) (65-67). Returning troops find themselves in a "limbo" between the DoD and the VA (67-71). The scandal of disability compensation inefficiencies (71-76), showing the urgent need to anticipate costs (76-78). Staffing problem at the Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA) (78-81). VA system overstretched (81-82). PTSD "highly prevalent" (82-84). The Bush administration is underfunding the VA (84-88). Estimates here are "very conservative" (88). There is a need to recognize veterans' benefits as "an additional major entitlement program" (89, emphasis in original).

Ch. 4: Costs of War That the Government Doesn't Pay. Nature of social and economic costs (91-93). DoD values lives lost at $500,000, instead of a more accurate $7.2 million in VSL ("value of statistical life," which peaks at 29) (93-96). The difficulty of estimating the cost of injuries (96-98). Iraq erases the traditional combat/support distinction re: injuries (98-99). The cost of mental health injuries (99-101). In Oct. 2007 the Veterans Benefits Disability Commission report found a high disparity between lost compensation and benefits (100). Quality of life impairment (i.e. pain) goes uncompensated (101-02). The strain and costs to families (102-05). The authors have been "excessively conservative" in estimate of social costs (107-11). Total in estimate: $300-400 billion (111-13).

Ch. 5: The Macroeconomic Effects of the Conflicts. It is a myth that war is good for the economy (114-15). The effect on the price of oil is estimated at $5-10 per barrel (116-20). The macroeconomic effects of government war spending (120-25). The impact on stock prices and the "legacy of household debt" are not calculated in the estimate (125-27). The macroeconomic costs are estimated at $1.9 billion in the "realistic-moderate" scenario (127-31).

Ch. 6: Global Consequences. Global costs (132). The cost of Iraqi deaths and injuries, using this methodology: $8.6 trillion (138; 133-39). The cost to Iraq's economy (139-44). The cost to the rest of the world, including the "clash of civilizations" (144-45). The cost to Afghanistan (145-47). The costs to the U.K., about $30.6 billion, budgetarily (147-56). The effect of higher oil prices on the world (156-59). Squandering of the U.S.'s leadership role as a cost (159-63).

Ch. 7: Exiting Iraq. The prospect of withdrawal, given failure (164-67). The U.S. is building bases and a huge embassy, preparing for a "long-term presence" (167-68). Costs must be considered in deciding the U.S.'s future role (168-70). That we can't leave until the "mission is accomplished" is a delusion (170-73). It is a mistake to think we can define some modest, realizable goal (173-75). Bush has extended the U.S. commitment when he should have cut losses (175-76). Unless there is some marked change before Nov. 2008, "there should be a rapid withdrawal" (176). There is good reason to think our presence in Iraq is making things worse (177-84).

Ch. 8: Learning from Our Mistakes: Reforms for the Future. The U.N. should provide an international check on U.S. actions (185-87). Recommended reforms: Wars should not be funded through "emergency" supplementals (189). War funding should be linked to strategy reviews (189). Accurate accounting measures should be instituted for defense (189-90). The secretary of defense and chief financial officer should be personally accountable for them (190-92). The administration and the Congressional Budget Office should provide regular estimates of micro- and macroeconomic costs of war (192-93). Mechanisms of freer information (193). Reliance on private contractors should be reviewed by Congress (193-96). The National Guard should be limited to one year's use by the military (196-97). There should be a presumption that wars are paid for with a surtax (197-98). Nine reforms favoring veterans (199-205). Such reforms would help avoid another Iraq (205-06).

President’s Letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives on the Emergency Appropriations Act, Oct. 17, 2001 (207-09).

[About the Authors. Joseph E. Stiglitz was born in 1943 in Gary, Indiana. After three years at Amherst, he completed his undergraduate degree at M.I.T. (his degree was awarded at Amherst). He did graduate work at the Univ. of Chicago, then completed his Ph.D. at M.I.T. in 1966-1967 while simultaneously holding an assistant professorship. He was a Fulbright research fellow at the University of Cambridge, then held academic positions at Yale, Duke, Stanford, Oxford University, and Princeton. He is currently at Columbia, with appointments in the Business School, the Dept. of Economics, and the School of International and Public Affairs. Stiglitz is generally considered a New-Keynesian, recognizing market imperfections and debunking the notion of an "invisible hand" guiding markets to efficient outcomes. His 2001 Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded for research on screening (a technique used by one economic agent to extract private information from another). Stiglitz joined the Clinton administration in 1992 as a member, then chair, of the Council of Economic Advisers. He served on the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and advanced a "third way" economic philosophy emphasizing the important, but sometimes limited, role the government can play in the economy. In 1997 he joined the World Bank as senior vice president for development policy and chief economist. His difficult relationship with Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers led to his resignation from the World Bank in January 2000. He criticized the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund for being dominated by market fundamentalists in his 2002 book, Globalization and Its Discontents, in which he said that the Seattle WTO protests were justified and that the U.S. was an obstacle to just reform, and argued that as a result globalization has made many worse off, giving rise to a backlash which would be "a tragedy for all of us, and especially for the billions who might otherwise have benefited" if it prevails. In 2006 he published Making Globalization Work. He has been married three times; his third wife is Anya Schiffrin of the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. -- Linda J. Bilmes is widely considered a leading expert in U.S. government finance and budgeting. She holds a B.A. and M.B.A. from Harvard, has published widely in the mainstream press, and teaches budgeting, applied budgeting, and public finance at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. She has also served as assistant secretary and chief financial officer of the U.S. Dept. of Commerce, deputy assistant secretary of commerce for administration, and on a number of U.S. commissions. For eight years she worked for The Boston Consulting Group, advising Eastern European nations and Russia on industrial strategy and the transition to market based democracy, according to her faculty web site.]