A 16-page Congressional Research Service report on Iran's nuclear program is available on the web site of the Federation of American Scientists, Steven Aftergood noted Tuesday in his newsletter, Secrecy News.[1]  --  "Iran's Nuclear Program: Status" supports the view, widely held among expert observers, that Iran has decided to develop the knowledge needed to build nuclear weapons in the future, but is not now pursuing the development of nuclear weapons themselves.  --  The report thus contradicts the subtext of most mainstream reporting on the U.S.-Iran standoff.  --  Written by Paul K. Kerr, analyst in nonproliferation at CRS's Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, the report says claims Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons are based only on "suspicions."  --  It notes that "Iranian officials have repeatedly asserted that the country's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes.  For example, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i declared during a June 3, 2008, speech that Iran is opposed to nuclear weapons 'based on religious and Islamic beliefs as well as based on logic and wisdom.'  He added, 'Nuclear weapons have no benefit but high costs to manufacture and keep them.  Nuclear weapons do not bring power to a nation because they are not applicable.  Nuclear weapons cannot be used'" (pp. 1-2).  --  "The main source of proliferation concern is Tehran's construction of a gas-centrifuge-based uranium enrichment facility," Kerr writes (p. 2).  --  "A heavy-water reactor, which Iran is construction at Arak, has also been a source of concern" (ibid.).  --  "In addition to the dual-use nature of the nuclear programs described above, Tehran's interactions with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have contributed to suspicions that Tehran has a nuclear weapons program.  In the past, Iran has taken several actions that interfered with the agency's investigation of its nuclear program, including concealing nuclear activities and providing misleading statements" (p. 3).  --  But "ElBaradei's May [2008] report points out that the IAEA, with the exception of the document related to uranium metal [for whose existence Iran has presented an adequate explanation], has 'no information . . . on the actual design or manufacture by Iran' of components (nuclear or otherwise) for nuclear weapons" (p. 7).  --  "The IAEA has been able to verify that Iran's declared nuclear facilities and materials have not been diverted for military purposes" (ibid.).  --  As for the claim in the December 2007 NIE shows at least that Iran was once pursuing nuclear weapons, the CRS report notes (pp. 13-14) that that document "defines 'nuclear weapons program' as 'Iran's nuclear weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work" — but as noted above, there is no evidence of any "nuclear weapon design and weaponization work," only of uranium conversion and enrichment.  --  Thus the oft-asserted claim in Western media that the NIE supports the view that up to 2003 Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons does not hold water, either.  --  Kerr also writes:  "In addition to the new intelligence, other factors suggest that Iran may not have an active nuclear weapons program.  First, the IAEA has resolved several of the outstanding issues described in the August 2007 Iran-IAEA work plan and has apparently not found additional evidence of a nuclear weapons program.  Indeed, the agency has not discovered significant undeclared Iranian nuclear activities for several years (although, as noted above, the IAEA's ability to monitor Iran's nuclear facilities has decreased).  Furthermore, Tehran, beginnin in 2003, has been willing to disclose previously undeclared nuclear activities to the IAEA (though, as previously discussed, Iran has not been fully cooperating with the agency).  In addition, Iran made significant changes to the administration of its nuclear program in fall 2003 — changes that produced greater openness with the IAEA and may have indicated a decision to stop a nuclear weapons program.  Finally, as noted above, Iranian officials have stated numerous times that Tehran is not seeking nuclear weapon, partly for religious reasons.  A change in this stance could arguably damage religious leaders' credibility" (p. 15).  --  But the CRS report has significant flaws.  --  It falsely asserts that "Iran resumed uranium conversion in August 2005 under the leadership of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who had been elected two months earlier" (p. 4).  --  In fact, this decision was made and executed before Ahmadinejad took power, as Anne Penketh reported at the time ("Iran in Showdown with EU over Its Nuclear Ambitions," Independent [London], Aug. 1, 2005), "Diplomats believe the Iranian authorities want to decide on the future of their talks with the Europeans before Mr. Ahmadinejad is sworn in next Saturday [i.e. on Aug. 6], so that any radical policy change would be seen as having been approved by the outgoing president, Mohammed Khatami."  --  Moreover, the CRS report omits the fact that authority over Iran's nuclear program is not in the Iranian president's power; policy is, rather, determined by the Supreme National Security Council, which reports directly to the Supreme Leader.  --  The report also ignores (except for a reference in a footnote Iran's defense that it has complied with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which it is (unlike Israel) a signatory....