[Translated from Le Monde diplomatique]

Media Self-Portraits of the Armed Resistance Groups

THE IRAQI OPPOSITION'S AUDIOVISUALS
By David Baran and Mathieu Guidère

** If the occupiers of Iraq have succeeded in giving the country a national assembly, a government, and a presidency, one after the other, they are still not succeeding in defeating those who resist. But who are these resisters? Former Baath Party partisans? Dispersed members of the former army? Terrorists from the al-Zarqawi group? Analysis of the texts and videos broadcast by these various elements allows us to understand them better. **

Le Monde diplomatique
May 2005
Page 9

--David Baran is a researcher and consultant; he is the author of Vivre la tyrannie et lui survivre: L'Irak en transition (Paris: Mille et une nuits, 2004) ('To Live under Tyranny and Survive It: Iraq in Transition'). Mathieu Guidère is an agrégé in Arabic and maître de conférences; he directs the Laboratoire d'analyse de l'information stratégique (Saint-Cyr).

The Iraqi armed opposition considers communication quite important, in ways that go far beyond the unique desire to terrorize. This desire has inspired an astonishingly abundant and diversified production of texts and images, which it would be wrong to reduce to their most brutal types. The threats in tracts that aim to intimidate obscure an impressive mass of cold, detailed, lucid analyses of the strategy to employ in defeating the adversary.[1] Similarly, the most monstrous video sequences eclipse a wealth of films, sometimes of professional quality, extending from "lectures" in classical Arabic on the manufacture of explosives to veritable presentation leaflets put out by new groups making their first public appearance.[2]

The most visible elements of the armed opposition have at their disposition specialized publications devoted to "news." The broadcasting of their messages depend on a number of sites, some of which, updated several times a day, amount to genuine online press agencies.[3] On one of them, a fighter recently called for "breaking down by every means the media isolation imposed upon the resistance."[4]

The intensity of these efforts naturally raises the question of the meaning of this propaganda in the eyes of the armed opposition, and also the question of its concrete effectiveness as a weapon in the conflict. In this regard, should we see its weak, even counterproductive impact in the West as a sign of its mediocrity and inadequacy?

In fact, while the conflict is more and more dominated by the discourse of American and Iraqi authorities, the enemy is almost inaudible, except for the noise of the explosions and the tumult of hostage-takings. The enemy's message is confused from the start as much by its own modes of production (word-of-mouth, traditional tracts, communiqués and videos published on evanescent internet sites, almost everything in Arabic) as by the difficulties that foreign observers have in getting access to it. Its reception is hurt by more or less voluntary censorship mechanisms: when they are broadcast, the videos, which are generally emptied of their argumentative content, keep certain "key images" that are considered pertinent. Finally, this discourse is often ruled out altogether: considered as the emanation of a "fanatical" or "bloody-minded" enemy, this could only be the rationalization of inarticulate violence, unworthy of interest and analysis. And since the enemy speaks only the language of terror, listening to him would already be bringing about his triumph.

Terror (irhab) is indeed a preoccupation of the armed opposition. If some of its component parts denounce its use, others explicitly claim its religious legitimacy and its practical reach. A recognized authority of Sunni Islam thus clearly distinguishes "illicit terrorism" from "licit terrorism," classifying the Iraqi case in the second category.[5] The Iraqi dignitary Mohammed Al-Alousi, for his part, cannot imagine even the possibility of a jihad without irhab.[6] On the military plane, detailed analyses published online and obviously coming from experienced fighters place terror at the heart of a theorization of psychological war. It appears there notably as a means of isolating the "collaboration" authorities from the rest of the population or of carrying the conflict, by the capture of foreigners, to other countries which would otherwise remain inaccessible.

IMPERATIVES OF LEGITIMATION

However, if communication with the adversary and his potential allies is carried out essentially in the mode of terror -- with a few rare exceptions[7] --, the discourse of the armed opposition answers other imperatives. The images and texts it produces even seem aimed, first of all, at the fighters themselves and an audience of sympathizers who already support the cause. It is part of what appears as a dynamic network of groups that are watching each other, forming alliances among themselves, or entering into competition in what amounts to an economy of violence. These groups construct a self-image of themselves and communicate actively amongst themselves.

In this context, an important portion of the propaganda supposed to be from one group or another consists of making one's action known and recognized to one's peers, whether they be allies, potential recruits, or competitors. Many communiqués think it enough to define how their authors position themselves on the ever-changing playing field of the armed opposition (by recognizing the authority of the Jordanian Abu Moussab al-Zarqawi, or, on the contrary, by denouncing attacks on civilians, etc.). Messages sent into this fluid mix carefully take into account the point of view of "opinion leaders" -- ulemas, respected intellectuals, etc.

The contents, even of the most violent of them, are thus responsive to imperatives of legitimation. The filmed executions of foreigners are no exception to this rule. They refer to a complex process of selecting victims and informing them of their "crimes," followed by a "trial" and the application of the "sentence." They are the occasion for attempts to theorize punishable acts, the circulation on the internet of advice on the treatment of certain types of prisoners "according to the rules of Arab hospitality," as well as elaborate stagings of the enactment of the "judgment of God."

To take the rationality of the enemy seriously requires, then, granting to him the sophistication that one is intuitively tempted to deny him. Thus a preoccupation with argument and credibility is visible in those efforts at communication that carefully avoid the excessively gross forms of propaganda. The fighters take care first of all of describing in as much detail as possible their actions and the "real losses" of an enemy who is thought to be trying to minimize them. Whence the abundance on the internet of short video sequences on this or that attack, usually claimed by a logo or a date, or even presented with an actual "layout." A fighter in a discussion forum even went so far as to congratulate himself on the "news model of the resistance" -- recommending to his peers that "teams of reporters, photographers, and cameramen" be trained.[8]

If we must speak of a certain "sophistication" in the discourse of the armed opposition, this is also because of the wealth of resources upon which it draws and that it handles skillfully. Grounding itself in a few verses of the Koran, it puts into play a repertoire drawn from Islamic and Arab nationalist history, but also from a long poetic tradition and from tribal folklore. The war being fought is assimilated to the battle of Badr, from which Mohammed and the first Muslims emerged victorious despite the crushing numerical superiority of the enemy. The "collaborators" are called children of Ibn Al-Alqami, from the name of the vizier who turned Baghdad over to the invading Mongols in the 13th century. Resistance figures like Hamza Ibna Abd Al-Muttalib or Omar Al-Mukhtar are evoked.[9] New patriotic hymns are composed. All these references are fused into an effective, polished rhetoric, taking the opposite view of American arguments of "liberty" and "progress" by embedding the present combat in a past of struggle and sacrifice.[10]

The armed opposition also draws on its own history, however recent, by laying hold of symbolic representations (scenes of joy, particularly) and founding events, which feed its vision of its own actions. It finds inspiration in the images of other conflicts, in Palestine, Afghanistan, and elsewhere (scenes borrowed from Hamas, for example). It exploits images Iraqis recognize: the many rumors of the attempts of the enemy to make their dead disappear have given rise to several long "documentaries" on American mass graves.[11] -- Finally, the international media and the coalition itself offer infinite resources to propagandists who make use of their images and slogans, revealing their contradictions and damning their hypocrisy.[12]

Thus, despite the tensions that run through the armed opposition and the very diversity of its origins, an astonishingly consistent and unified body of symbols is apparent in the discourses it produces. The vocabulary and references employed are by now widely shared: the fighters are mujahideen, and the enemy is an unbelieving occupation force assimilated to the crusaders or the barbarians; its objective is said to be the perpetuation of an "Americano-Zionist" imperial domination through a puppet government in the pay of the United States and its exogenous allies (former exiles, pro-Iranian Shiites, and secessionist Kurds...). The power of the enemy is not only admitted, it is exaggerated in order to point up the values of those who oppose it, which all converge toward the ideal of the original supporters of Islam (ingeniousness, courage, self-abnegation, sacrifice, piety...). From this flows a conception of "victory" as the simple pursuit of the struggle, through the gift of self.

Such a timeless vision explains in part the inability of the totality of the groups in the armed opposition, with very rare exceptions[13], to construct any alternative solution to propose as a substitute for the transition the United States is backing. Consistent with a military strategy that seeks to avoid any normalization, their political program scarcely proposes anything except forms of individual participation in the community of believers. And no effort was made to administer the sanctuaries they held during the course of 2004, beyond a rather loose coordination of groups of fighters. So far, the discussion forums confirm a total lack of interest in any organization that would go beyond the stage of simple coordination, the goal of which is merely increased military efficiency.

This difficulty to project into the future is due to two additional factors. From an ideological point of view, a genuine American disengagement is thought to be unthinkable -- and impossible, in fact, given the dependence of the transition with respect to its godfather. From a more practical point of view, to recognize the prospect of such a disengagement would turn out to be problematic in that this admission would fracture the apparent unity of the armed opposition and would stir up tensions and dissent. Besides, if the strength of this discourse lies in the explicit articulation of a unifying body of symbols, its most obvious weaknesses are to be found in its silences. Among them, some are to be expected in wartime and are not very serious: thus the strictest discretion reigns over the money-making function of hostage-taking, though this is a decisive factor, and over the obvious connections between jihad and banditry.

POPULARITY IN FREEFALL

In a less anodyne manner, the absence of sustained reflection on the weak points of the armed opposition and the factors that are likely to favor a victory of the adversary are evidence of a mode of communication that proscribes self-criticism out of fear of being discredited. Above all, the weariness of a vast majority of Iraqis with respect to acts of violence is hardly ever taken into account in an analysis that seems not to know that the "center of gravity" of any war of insurrection/counterinsurrection is none other than the population.

Thus the armed opposition seems unaware or indifferent to the spectacular change that has taken place in its relations with the Iraqi population since the era of two fronts, in Fallujah and the south, when it had gained some measure of undeniable popular support (spring 2004). Now, if its capacity for action remains considerable, its popularity has greatly declined and has been reduced to some zones where inhabitants are apparently more ambivalent and frightened than fully in solidarity. But the discussion forums take no account of this development.

The elections of January 30, 2005, taken seriously by a considerable portion of the population, including some districts of Baghdad where Sunni Arabs dominate, are dismissed as elections without political parties, under foreign occupation, no discussion being possible with the occupiers of the country. The long wait for results confirmed all the suspicions of a deal with Washington coming out of elections that could only be fixed, leading to a "Parliament of collaborators." In the same vein, the confessions extorted from "terrorists" and broadcast on Iraqi television are treated as gross fabrications, without taking into account the strong impression that they are making on many Iraqis.

Certainly, various groups are openly worried about the negative repercussions of certain kinds of action. Some efforts to be more friendly to the population can be perceived. Families of innocent prisoners taken in the big American round-ups are watched over in the absence of the head of the family. Many civilians who are displaced by major military operations and left to their own devices by the authorities are said also to be the object of aid.

But it's essentially a matter of keeping alive a breeding ground of sympathizers from which to recruit new fighters. A genuine mobilization of the population is not the object of any attempt at conceptualization, much less of systematic analysis. On the whole, the question boils down to determining who is for and who is against the occupation -- even if the answers vary according to the groups. Convinced of the legitimacy of its cause, the armed opposition thinks of itself as an avant-garde and is not trying to rally support from a passive majority. To the point that one may wonder whether the device of the internet, which brings peers together in an imagined umma, is not comforting it with illusions about its ability to win... without convincing the Iraqis.

[1]Cf. for example http://www.islammemo.cc/taqrer/one_news.asp?Idnew=292
[2]Cf. the video *Al-Dhurwa* ('The Apogee') of the "Companies of Islamic Anger."
[3]Cf. http://www.us.moheet.com
[4]Cf. http://www.la7odood.com
[5]Cf. http://www.balagh.com/thaqafa/0604ggpz.htm
[6]Cf. http://www.albasrah.net
[7]For a remarkable propaganda film in English, cf. http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article7468.htm
[8]Cf. http://www.la7odood.com
[9]The former, an uncle of the prophet Mohammed, is one of the most famous martyrs of Islam and the hero of a popular novel; the latter, a hero of the Libyan resistance, is presented as "the father of martyrs."
[10]Cf. the video "Ajdâd wa Ahfâd: Muqârana Bain Mâdhî Al-Umma Al-Islâmîya wa Hâdhariha" ('Ancestors and Descendants: Comparison of the Islamic Community's Past and Its Present').
[11]Cf. the videos "Râyât Al-Haqq ('The Banners of Truth'), by Jaish Ansâr Al-Sunna, and "Halâk Al-Salîbiyîn Fawq Ardh Al-Râfidain" ('The Damnation of the Crusaders in the Land of the Two Rivers'), by Jaish Al-Irâq Al-Islâmi.
[12]Cf. inter alia http://www.albasrah.net
[13]For a draft of a Constitution that includes a section on the creation of a minister of jihad, cf. http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org

--
Translated by Mark K. Jensen
Associate Professor of French
Department of Languages and Literatures
Pacific Lutheran University
Tacoma, WA 98447-0003
Phone: 253-535-7219
Home page: http://www.plu.edu/~jensenmk/
E-mail: jensenmk@plu.edu