To those on the other side from the nuclear merchants in the debates over nuclear proliferation during the last fifty years, the current concerns of the Bush Administration about Iran's nuclear program have always seemed duplicitous and manipulative. -- Now a major media outlet, the Washington Post, has whispered the truth on page A15 of its Sunday, Mar. 27, 2005, edition. -- Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and Cheney all played major roles as part of the Ford Administration in greasing the wheels to allow the Shah to install plutonium-processing equipment. -- Furthermore, the major motivating factor at the time was commercial gain by some key corporations. -- In considering the stupidity of this effort, it is important to remember what a megalomaniac the Shah was, as well as the subsequent course of history. -- If the world had avoided an incident with a nuclear-armed Shah, it could easily have faced a nuclear-armed revolutionary government. -- It also worthy of note how past U.S. governments have winked at and even enabled allies to acquire nuclear weapons, yet the present administration insists on rules outside of international agreements for regimes it wishes to demonize and target. -- Assuming the Bush administration really wants an agreement with Iran that prevents it from acquiring nuclear bombs, contemplate just how much easier that goal would be if Israel were also pressured to give up such weapons....
PAST ARGUMENTS DON'T SQUARE WITH CURRENT IRAN POLICY By Dafna
Linzer
Washington Post March 27, 2005 Page A15
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A3983-2005Mar26.html
Lacking direct evidence, Bush administration officials argue that Iran's
nuclear program must be a cover for bomb-making. Vice President Cheney recently
said, "They're already sitting on an awful lot of oil and gas. Nobody can figure
why they need nuclear as well to generate energy."
Yet Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and outgoing Deputy
Secretary Paul Wolfowitz held key national security posts when the Ford
administration made the opposite argument 30 years ago.
Ford's team endorsed Iranian plans to build a massive nuclear energy
industry, but also worked hard to complete a multibillion-dollar deal that would
have given Tehran control of large quantities of plutonium and enriched uranium
-- the two pathways to a nuclear bomb. Either can be shaped into the core of a
nuclear warhead, and obtaining one or the other is generally considered the most
significant obstacle to would-be weapons builders.
Iran, a U.S. ally then, had deep pockets and close ties to Washington. U.S.
companies, including Westinghouse and General Electric, scrambled to do business
there.
"I don't think the issue of proliferation came up," Henry A. Kissinger, who
was Ford's secretary of state, said in an interview for this article.
The U.S. offer, details of which appear in declassified documents reviewed by
the Washington Post, did not include the uranium enrichment capabilities
Iran is seeking today. But the United States tried to accommodate Iranian
demands for plutonium reprocessing, which produces the key ingredient of a bomb.
After balking initially, President Gerald R. Ford signed a directive in 1976
offering Tehran the chance to buy and operate a U.S.-built reprocessing facility
for extracting plutonium from nuclear reactor fuel. The deal was for a complete
"nuclear fuel cycle" -- reactors powered by and regenerating fissile materials
on a self-sustaining basis.
That is precisely the ability the current administration is trying to prevent
Iran from acquiring today.
"If we were facing an Iran with a reprocessing capability today, we would be
even more concerned about their ability to use plutonium in a nuclear weapon,"
said Corey Hinderstein, a nuclear specialist with the Institute for Science and
International Security. "These facilities are well understood and can be
safeguarded, but it would provide another nuclear option for Iran."
Nuclear experts believe the Ford strategy was a mistake. As Iran went from
friend to foe, it became clear to subsequent administrations that Tehran should
be prevented from obtaining the technologies for building weapons. But that is
not the argument the Bush administration is making. Such an argument would be
unpopular among parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which guarantees
members access to nuclear power regardless of their political systems.
The U.S.-Iran deal was shelved when the shah was toppled in the 1979
revolution that led to the taking of American hostages and severing of
diplomatic relations.
Despite the changes in Iran, now run by a clerical government, the country's
public commitment to nuclear power and its insistence on the legal right to
develop it have remained the same. Iranian officials reiterated the position
last week at a conference on nuclear energy in Paris.
Mohammad Saeidi, a vice president of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran,
told the conference that Iran was determined to develop nuclear power since oil
and natural gas supplies were limited.
U.S. involvement with Iran's nuclear program until 1979, which accompanied
large-scale intelligence-sharing and conventional weapons sales, highlights the
boomerang in U.S. foreign policy. Even with many key players in common, the U.S.
government has taken opposite positions on questions of fact as its perception
of U.S. interests has changed.
Using arguments identical to those made by the shah 30 years ago, Iran says
its nuclear program is essential to meet growing energy requirements, and is not
intended for bombs. Tehran revived the program in secret, its officials say, to
prevent the United States from trying to stop it. Iran's account is under
investigation by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is trying to
determine whether Iran also has a parallel nuclear weapons program.
Since the energy program was exposed, in 2002, the Bush administration has
alternately said that Iran has a secret nuclear weapons program or wants one.
Without being able to prove those claims, the White House has made its case by
implication, beginning with the point that Iran has ample oil reserves for its
energy needs.
Ford's team commended Iran's decision to build a massive nuclear energy
industry, noting in a declassified 1975 strategy paper that Tehran needed to
"prepare against the time -- about 15 years in the future -- when Iranian oil
production is expected to decline sharply."
Estimates of Iran's oil reserves were smaller then than they are now, but
energy experts and U.S. intelligence estimates continue to project that Iran
will need an alternative energy source in the coming decades. Iran's population
has more than doubled since the 1970s, and its energy demands have increased
even more.
The Ford administration -- in which Cheney succeeded Rumsfeld as chief of
staff and Wolfowitz was responsible for nonproliferation issues at the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency -- continued intense efforts to supply Iran with
U.S. nuclear technology until President Jimmy Carter succeeded Ford in 1977.
That history is absent from major Bush administration speeches, public
statements and news conferences on Iran.
In an opinion piece on Iran in the Post on March 9, Kissinger wrote
that "for a major oil producer such as Iran, nuclear energy is a wasteful use of
resources." White House spokesman Scott McClellan cited the article during a
news briefing, saying that it reflected the administration's current thinking on
Iran.
In 1975, as secretary of state, Kissinger signed and circulated National
Security Decision Memorandum 292, titled "U.S.-Iran Nuclear Cooperation," which
laid out the administration's negotiating strategy for the sale of nuclear
energy equipment projected to bring U.S. corporations more than $6 billion in
revenue. At the time, Iran was pumping as much as 6 million barrels of oil a
day, compared with an average of about 4 million barrels daily today.
The shah, who referred to oil as "noble fuel," said it was too valuable to
waste on daily energy needs. The Ford strategy paper said the "introduction of
nuclear power will both provide for the growing needs of Iran's economy and free
remaining oil reserves for export or conversion to petrochemicals."
Asked why he reversed his opinion, Kissinger responded with some surprise
during a brief telephone interview. After a lengthy pause, he said: "They were
an allied country, and this was a commercial transaction. We didn't address the
question of them one day moving toward nuclear weapons."
Charles Naas, who was deputy U.S. ambassador to Iran in the 1970s, said
proliferation was high in the minds of technical experts, "but the nuclear deal
was attractive in terms of commerce, and the relationship as a whole was very
important."
Documents show that U.S. companies, led by Westinghouse, stood to gain $6.4
billion from the sale of six to eight nuclear reactors and parts. Iran was also
willing to pay an additional $1 billion for a 20 percent stake in a private
uranium enrichment facility in the United States that would supply much of the
uranium to fuel the reactors.
Naas said Cheney, Wolfowitz, and Rumsfeld all were in positions to play
significant roles in Iran policy then, "but in those days, you have to view
Kissinger as the main figure." Requests for comment from the offices of Cheney,
Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld went unanswered.
"It is absolutely incredible that the very same players who made those
statements then are making completely the opposite ones now," said Joseph
Cirincione, a nonproliferation expert at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. "Do they remember that they said this? Because the Iranians
sure remember that they said it," said Cirincione, who just returned from a
nuclear conference in Tehran -- a rare trip for U.S. citizens now.
In what Cirincione described as "the worst idea imaginable," the Ford
administration at one point suggested joint Pakistani-Iranian reprocessing as a
way of promoting "nonproliferation in the region," because it would cut down on
the need for additional reprocessing facilities.
Gary Sick, who handled nonproliferation issues under presidents Ford, Carter,
and Reagan, said the entire deal was based on trust. "That's the bottom line."
"The shah made a big convincing case that Iran was going to run out of gas
and oil and they had a growing population and a rapidly increasing demand for
energy," Sick said. "The mullahs make the same argument today, but we don't
trust them."
--Researcher Robert E. Thomason and staff writer Justin Blum contributed
to this report.
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