This interesting commentary, from the unusual source of a firm specializing in advice to businesses interested in international affairs, gives voice to some of our worst fears about the assassination and broader events in the Middle East. -- The author places events in the context of a major shift in U.S. policy in the region from one of using Saudi wealth and American influence to stabilize the region to one "that is basically Israeli in origin and orientation." -- He also calls attention to the need for U.S. policy makers to "achieve" a quick success in the "War on Terrorism" because of the mounting cost and looming U.S. financial crisis....
DECEPTION By Chris Sanders
** Deception is the first rule of war. **
Sanders Research Associates February 21, 2005
http://www.sandersresearch.com/sanders/newsmanager/faq.aspx
--We are at war, therefore look
where your own feet stand. --Orville X
DEATH IN THE AFTERNOON
The assassination of Rafiq Hariri invited recollection of another Sidon
native assassinated almost exactly thirty years ago in February 1975, Marouf
Saad. The anniversary of Saad’s death has a meaning that cannot have escaped the
notice of Hariri’s killers. His assassination is generally accepted as the event
that precipitated the Lebanese civil war.
Hariri’s funeral two days after his killing completed the humiliation of the
government of Emile Lahoud, who was pointedly told by the family of the dead
Hariri to stay away. Syria, backer of the Lahoud government, was predictably
blamed for the assassination, the premise being that he had called for Syria to
withdraw its troops from Lebanon last October. The United States poured oil on
the fire by recalling its ambassador to Syria, showing thereby who it blames for
Hariri’s death and in the process upping the pressure on the Lahoud government
and encouraging the Lebanese opposition.
RUSH TO JUDGMENT
Syria sensibly denied responsibility, equally sensibly pointing out that it
had nothing to gain and a lot to lose by such an act. There is no doubt that the
Syrian regime is ruthless enough to use assassination as a tool and competent
enough to make it happen, but a rush to judgment is still just a rush and not a
judgment. The most convincing argument we have heard is that Syria knows it will
sooner or later have to bow to U.S., French and Israeli pressure to get out of
Lebanon, and was unwilling to leave behind such a powerful and well-funded
politician to fill the vacuum that Syria’s departure would leave. This is
conceivable; the objective would be to leave behind a complete mess, the better
to confuse and occupy the opposition. Without Hariri and his money it seems to
us highly unlikely that the disparate groups that make up Lebanon’s "opposition"
will find it possible to remain united.
Conceivable maybe, likely, not. Tempting as it may be to believe this line of
reasoning, doing so is fraught with problems. To begin with, it is a high cost,
high risk strategy with the costs front-end loaded. There is virtually no way
that Syria would not be blamed for such an act, which could only isolate Syria
in the court of world opinion and which can only advance the cause of those in
Israel and the United States who would like to see regime change in Damascus.
And it is difficult to imagine any country with more to lose from an unstable
Lebanon than Syria.
Lost in the welter of accusations and counter accusations is much if any
analysis of Hariri himself. This usually stops with crediting the billionaire
with the reconstruction of Lebanon in the wake of its bloody civil war. While he
gets the credit, the money came from Saudi Arabia, and he doled it out to every
group in the country. Even so, the tangible results are pretty thin. The country
still does not even have enough electric power, and the high profile
reconstruction of central Beirut is actually confined to quite a small area. The
towering and empty wreck of the old Holiday Inn is a grim reminder of how far
the country has to go to put the war behind it. But the most important thing is
that there is no evidence that we are aware of that Hariri was in any way
anti-Syrian; indeed he seemed to be groping for a way to defuse the escalating
conflict between the U.S. and Israel on one side, and Syria and the Lahoud
government on the other. There is no reason other than conjecture to suppose
that Syria wanted to escalate matters, but there is good reason to think that
the Americans and Israelis would.
It has to be said that in spite of his good press, Hariri was not universally
admired. In Saudi Arabia he was for many a symbol of the corruption that went
hand in hand with the expenditure of hundreds of billions in oil revenue. His
specialty was building palaces and his patron was the now semi-comatose king,
Fahd bin Abdulaziz, who used a maintenance contract for his palaces as the pipe
through which to funnel the money used to buy off Lebanon’s factions. There is
little wonder then that Hariri’s death is so universally mourned in that little
country. He was the tap on the end of that pipe and competent to boot.
DISEQUILIBRIUM POLITICS
In retrospect his assassination should probably be less of a surprise than
the fact that he survived as long as he did. He and his patron Fahd symbolise an
old equilibrium in the politics of the region that became untenable once the
United States decided on a global offensive informed by the regional priorities
of its client Israel. The Taif Agreement of October 1989 legitimised the
presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon and committed Saudi largesse as part of a
larger strategic plan to stabilize the region under the aegis of the United
States, an important part of which was the commitment of the latter to bring
about a peace agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians. It was this
basic framework that made possible the coalition assembled by the US during the
Gulf War in 1990, which, be it not forgotten, included Syrian troops.
The adoption by Messrs. Cheney, Rumsfeld & Bush of a strategic plan that
is basically Israeli in origin and orientation swept
away the basis for the existing regional equilibrium. Indeed,
sweeping away the equilibrium is exactly what that plan is intended to do. The
Taif equilibrium bound Israel to find a settlement with the Palestinians toward
which Israel’s leadership was at best equivocal, because that equilibrium
neutralised Israeli freedom of action to unilaterally define its role in the
regional political economy. With the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin and the
assumption of power by Binyamin Netanyahu in the mid-90s, equivocation became
open hostility. The Israeli, or rather Zionist, dilemma was and is really quite
simple. A settlement with the Palestinians and regional peace means openness,
openness means Palestinian access to Saudi funding, and Saudi funding plus the
Palestinian birthrate spell the end, ultimately, of an Israeli state defined by
a Jewish as opposed to a national identity.
IN POLICIS THERE ARE ONLY INTERESTS . . .
It is this basic alignment of interests that informs the behavior of the
powers in the region. Israel talks the language of peace and democracy but
cannot afford either because of the most basic issue of identity. The Arab
states cannot win a war against a nuclear Israel with American resupply
privileges, but they can win a peace. It is for this reason that Syria’s
protestations of innocence in the Hariri affair are believable; applying the
useful yardstick of the "cui bono?" [Latin, 'To whose good?' -- J.O.M.]
principle it is difficult to see what the Syrians, whose behavior over the years
has been nothing if not pragmatic, would gain.
Pragmatic too was the Russian-Syrian arms deal announced at the end of
January, which will result in an upgrade of Syrian military capability that
highlights the biggest challenge facing the American and Israeli offensive,
time. In general, time is on the side of an offensive party as long as it can
choose it. Delay only allows opposition to coalesce and organize. The U.S. and
Israel no longer have the advantage of strategic surprise and the clock is
ticking, measured by the dollars the War on Terror is stripping from the U.S.
Treasury. Already, the cost of the Iraq and Afghanistan occupations have over
two years surpassed $300 billion, making this the most expensive two years of
warfare in American history. The Defense Department’s operating deficit for
FY2004 (ended in September last year) was $650 billion. And belying the current
fashion for so-called austerity, the cost of Medicare has soared thanks to the
passage of the administration’s Medicare Prescription Drug Plan, which adds a
stupefying $8.12 trillion net present value to future federal
liabilities. Four years ago the net present value of future net Medicare
expenditure was equal to the net present value of future net Social Security
liabilities. Today it is double the comparable Social Security number. . . . EVEN
IF THEY ARE CRAZY INTERESTS
The message from Washington could not be clearer: damn the torpedoes, full
speed ahead. The financial implications of the Medicare Prescription Drug Plan
will not be lost on China, whose purchases of U.S. debt are financing so much of
the government’s deficit, and the strategic implications of its runaway military
budget will not be lost on the other powers, who can only look at the financial
and military mess in Iraq and shrug. After nearly four years of trying, the U.S.
has yet to score a real success in its War on Terror. It needs one badly, no
matter what the price.
Pity poor Lebanon in the cross fire.
--SANDERS RESEARCH ASSOCIATES is an independent firm incorporated in
Ireland specializing in the analysis of the global political economy for
individuals and companies with an interest in international affairs. SRA was
established in 1997 in response to a need we perceived in the financial markets
for objective and independent analysis of the international capital and credit
markets. Our work is predicated on the principle that getting the right answers
is only useful if the right question is being asked. We are not privileged to
'inside information' -- all our work is based on published information and data.
Our clients pay us for our experience, analysis and judgment. We use this to
help them ask the right questions. Our client base is small, but includes some
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included econometric modelling and special studies on industries and countries.
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