In this passage from a well-known and often reprinted essay written in the 1930s, Aldous Huxley analyzes the ways in which people use language to help them tolerate what would be intolerable if its full reality were confronted: modern war. -- The "information operations" of contemporary military organizations far surpass those of Huxley's day, but the principles involved remain, for the most part, the same....
From WORDS AND BEHAVIOR By Aldous Huxley
Collected Essays (NY: Bantam Books, 1960) Pages 246-52
Consider, for example, the case of war. War is enormously discreditable to
those who order it to be waged and even to those who merely tolerate its
existence. Furthermore, to developed sensibilities the facts of war are
revolting and horrifying. To falsify these facts, and by so doing to make war
seem less evil than it really is, and our own responsibility in tolerating war
less heavy, is doubly to our advantage. By suppressing and distorting the truth,
we protect our sensibilities and preserve our self-esteem. Now, language is,
among other things, a device which men use for suppressing and distorting the
truth. Finding the reality of war too unpleasant to contemplate, we create a
verbal alternative to that reality, parallel with it, but in quality quite
different from it. That which we contemplate thenceforward is not that to which
we react emotionally and upon which we pass our moral judgments, is not war as
it is in fact, but the fiction of war as it exists in our pleasantly falsifying
verbiage. Our stupidity in using inappropriate language turns out, on analysis,
to be the most refined cunning.
The most shocking fact about war is that its victims and its instruments are
individual human beings, and that these individual human beings are condemned by
the monstrous conventions of politics to murder or be murdered in quarrels not
their own, to inflict upon the innocent, and innocent themselves of any crime
against their enemies, to suffer cruelties of every kind.
The language of strategy and politics is designed, so far as it is possible,
to conceal this fact, to make it appear as though wars were not fought by
individuals drilled murder one another in cold blood and without provocation,
but either by impersonal and therefore wholly non-moral and impassible forces,
or else by personified abstractions.
Here are a few examples of the first kind of falsification. In place of
"cavalrymen" or "foot-soldiers" military writers like to speak of "sabres" and
"rifles." Here is a sentence from a description of the Battle of Marengo:
"According to Victor's report, the French retreat was orderly; it is certain, at
any rate, that the regiments held together, for the six thousand Austrian sabres
found no opportunity to charge home." The battle is between sabres in line and
muskets in échelon -- a mere class of ironmongery.
On other occasions there is no question of anything so vulgarly material as
ironmongery. The battles are between Platonic ideals, between abstractions of
physics and mathematics. Forces interact; weights are flung into scales; masses
are set in motion. Or else it is all a matter of geometry. Lines swing and
sweep; are protracted or curved; pivot on a fixed point.
Alternatively, the combatants are personal, in the sense that they are
personifications. There is "the enemy," in the singular, making "his" plans,
striking "his" blows. The attribution of personal characteristics to
collectivities, to geographical expressions, to institutions, is a source, as we
shall see, of endless confusions of political thought, of innumerable political
mistakes and crimes. Personification in politics is an error which we make
because it is to our advantage as egotists to be able to feel violently proud of
our country and of ourselves as belonging to it, and to believe that all the
misfortunes due to our own mistakes are really the work of the Foreigner. It is
easier to feel violently toward a person than toward an abstraction; hence our
habit of making political personifications. In some cases military
personifications are merely special instances of poltical personifications. A
particular collectivity, the army or the warring nation, is given the name and,
along with the name, the attributes of a single person, in order that we may be
able to love or hate it more intensely than we could do if we thought of it as
what it really is: a number of diverse individuals. In other cases
personification is used for the purpose of concealing the fundamental absurdity
and monstrosity of war. What is absurd and monstrous about war is that men who
have no personal quarrel should be trained to murder one another in cold blood.
By personifying opposing armies or countries, we are able to think of war as a
conflict between individuals. The same result is obtained by writing about war
as though it were carried on exclusively by the generals in command and not by
the private soldiers in their armies. ("Rennenkampf had pressed back von
Schubert.") The implication in both cases is that war is indistinguishable from
a bout of fisticuffs in a bar room. Whereas in reality it is profoundly
different. A scrap between two individuals is forgivable; mass murder,
deliberately organized, is a monstrous iniquity. We still choose war as an
instrument of policy; and to comprehend the full wickedness and absurdity of war
would therefore be inconvenient. For, once we understood, we should have to make
some effort to get rid of the abominable thing. Accordingly, when we talk about
war, we use a language which conceals or embellishes its reality. Ignoring the
facts, so far as we possibly can, we imply that battles are not fought by
soldiers, but by things, principles, allegories, personified collectivities, or
(at the most human) by opposing commanders, pitched against one another in
single combat. For the same reason, when we have to describe the processes and
the results of war, we employ a rich variety of euphemisms. Even the most
violently patriotic and militaristic are reluctant to call a spade by its own
name. To conceal their intentions even from themselves, they make use of
picturesque metaphors. We find them, for example, clamoring for war planes
numerous and powerful enough to go and "destroy the hornets in their nests" --
in other words, to go and throw thermite, high explosives and vesicants [i.e.
chemical weapons; mustard gas is a vesicant] upon the inhabitants of neighboring
countries before they have time to come and do the same to us. And how
reassuring is the language of historians and strategists! They write admiringly
of those military geniuses who know "when to strike at the enemy's line" (a
single combatant deranges the geometrical constructions of a personification);
when to "turn his flank"; when to "execute an enveloping movement." As though
they were engineers discussing the strength of materials and the distribution of
stresses, they talk of abstract entitites called "man power" and "fire power."
They sum up the long-drawn sufferings and atrocities of trench warfare in the
phrase, "a war of attrition"; the massacre and mangling of human beings is
assimilated to the grinding of a lens.
A dangerously abstract word, which figures in all discussions about war, is
"force." Those who believe in organizing collective security by means of
military pacts against a possible aggressor are particularly fond of this word.
"You cannot," they say, "have international justice unless you are prepared to
impose it by force." "Peace-loving countries must unite to use force against
aggressive dictatorships." "Democratic institutions must be protected, if need
be, by force." And so on.
Now, the word "force," when used in reference to human relations, has no
single, definite meaning. There is the "force" used by parents when, without
resort to any kind of physical violence, they compel their children to act or
refrain from acting in some particular way. There is the "force" used by
attendants in an asylum when they try to prevent a maniac from hurting himself
or others. There is the "force" used by the police when they control a crowd,
and that other "force" which they use in a baton charge. And finally there is
the "force" used in war. This, of course, varies with the technological devices
at the disposal of the belligerents, with the policies they are pursuing, and
with the particular circumstances of the war in question. But in general it may
be said that, in war, "force" connotes violence and fraud used to the limit of
the combatants' capacity.
Variations in quanity, if sufficiently great, produce variations in quality.
The "force" that is war, particularly modern war, is very different from the
"force" that is police action, and the use of the same abstract word to describe
the two dissimilar processes is profoundly misleading. (Still more misleading,
of course, is the explicit assimilation of a war, waged by allied
League-of-Nations powers against an aggressor, to police action against a
criminal. The first is the use of violence and fraud without limit against
innocent and guilty alike; the second is the use of strictly limited violence
and a minimum of fraud exclusively against the guilty.)
Reality is a succession of concrete and particular situations. When we think
about such situations we should use the particular and concrete words which
apply to them. If we use abstract words equally well (and equally badly) to
other, quite dissimilar situations, it is certain that we shall think
incorrectly.
Let us take the sentences quoted above and translate the abstract word
"force" into language that will render (however inadequately) the concrete and
particular realities of contemporary warfare.
"You cannot have international justice, unless you are prepared to impose it
by force." Translated, this becomes: "You cannot have international justice
unless you are prepared, with a view to imposing a just settlement, to drop
thermite, high explosives, and vesicants upon the upon the inhabitants of
foreign cities and to have thermite, high explosives and vesicants dropped in
return upon the inhabitants of your cities." At the end of this proceeding,
justice is to be imposed by the victorious party -- that is, if there is a
victorious party. It should be remarked that justice was to have been imposed by
the victorious party at the end of the last war. But unfortunately, after four
years of fighting, the temper of the victors was such that they were quite
incapable of making a just settlement. The Allies are reaping in Nazi Germany
what they sowed at Versailles. The victors of the next war will have undergone
intensive bombardments with thermite, high explosives and vesicants. Will their
temper be better than that of the Allies in 1918? Will they be in a fitter state
to make a just settlement? The answer, quite obviously, is: No. It is
psychologically all but impossible that justice should be secured by the methods
of contemporary warfare.
The next two sentences may be taken together. "Peace-loving countries must
unite to use force against aggressive dictatorships. Democratic institutions
must be protected, if need be, by force." Let us translate. "Peace-loving
countries must unite to throw thermite, high explosives and vesicants on the
inhabitants of countries ruled by aggressive dictators. They must do this, and
of course abide the consequences, in order to preserve peace and democratic
institutions." Two questions immediately propound themselves. First, is it
likely that peace can be secured by a process calculated to reduce the orderly
life of our complicated societies to chaos? And, second, is it likely that
democratic institutions will flourish in a state of chaos.? Again, the answers
are pretty clearly in the negative.
By using the abstract word "force," instead of terms which at least attempt
to describe the realities of war as it is today, the preachers of collective
security through military collaboration disguise from themselves and from
others, not only the contemporary facts, but also the probable consequences of
their favorite policy The attempt to secure justice, peace, and democracy by
"force" seems reasonable enough until we realize, first, that this noncommittal
word stands, in the circumstances of our age, for activities which can hardly
fail to result in social chaos; and second, that the consequences of social
chaos are injustice, chronic warfare and tyranny. The moment we think in
concrete and particular terms of the concrete and particular process called
"modern war," we see that a policy which worked (or at least didn't result in
complete disaster) in the past has no prospect whatever of working in the
immediate future. The attempt to secure justice, peace and democracy by means of
a "force," which means, at this particular moment of history, thermite, high
explosives and vesicants, is about as reasonable as the attempt to put out a
fire with a colorless liquid that happens to be, not water, but petrol.
What applies to the "force" that is war applies in large measure to the
"force" that is revolution. It seems inherently very unlikely that social
justice and social peace can be securied by thermite, high explosives and
vesicants. At first, it may be, the parties in a civil war would hesitate to use
such instruments on their fellow-countrymen. But there can be little doubt that,
if the conflict were prolonged (as it probably would be between the evenly
balanced Right and Left of a highly industrialized society), the combatants
would end by losing their scruples.
The alternatives confronting us seem to be plain enough. Either we invent and
conscientiously employ a new technique for making revolutions and settling
international disputes; or else we cling to the old technique and, using "force"
(that is to say, thermite, high explosives and vesicants), destroy ourselves.
Those who, for whatever motive, disguise the nature of the second alternative
under inappropriate language, render the world a grave disservice. They lead us
into one of the temptations we find it hardest to resist -- the temptation to
run away from reality, to pretend that facts are not what they are. Like Shelley
(but without Shelley's acute awareness of what he was doing) we are perpetually
weaving
A shroud of talk to hide us from the
sun Of this familiar life. ["Leghorn, July 1,
1820"]
We protect our minds by an elaborate system of abstractions, ambiguities,
metaphors and similes from the reality we do not wish to know too clearly; we
lie to ourselves, in order that we may still have the excuse of ignorance, the
alibi of stupidity and incomprehension, possessing which we can continue with a
good conscience to commit and tolerate the most monstrous crimes:
The poor wretch who has learned his only
prayers From curses, who knows scarcely words
enough To ask a blessing from his Heavenly
Father, Becomes a fluent phraseman,
absolute And technical in victories and
defeats, And all our dainty terms for
fratricide; Terms which we trundle smoothly
o'er our tongues Like mere abstractions, empty
sounds to which We join no meaning and attach
no form! As if the soldier died without a
wound: As if the fibers of this godlike
frame Were gored without a pang: as if the
wretch Who fell in battle, doing bloody
deeds, Passed off to Heaven translated and not
killed; As though he had no wife to pine for
him, No God to judge him. [Coleridge, 'Fears in
Solitude' (1798)]
The language we use about war is inappropriate, and its inappropriateness is
designed to conceal a reality so odious that we do not wish to know it. The
language we use about politics is also inappropriate; but here our mistake has a
different purpose . . .
--Originally published in book form in The Olive Tree [1936].
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